THE NUKE SEASON REVISITED

 Because this month marks the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ending the Second World War, I am reprinting the 2009 original with minor updates.

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What does baseball have to do with atom bombs?

A whimsical baseball movie was the 1949 Ray Milland offering, It Happens Every Spring. It’s an enjoyable tale about a college professor who invents a formula that repels wood, making it impossible for a batter to hit a ball coated with the stuff. The title refers to the annual onset of spring training.

That’s a lot like The Nuke Season. It happens every August with the anniversaries of the A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since we’re now into this year’s Nuke Season, I’ll address the matter.

(Caution: if facts do not matter to you, skip this Rant. Some people prefer emotion to facts.)

Inevitably The Nuke Season features the following:

The bombs were unnecessary since Japan was about to surrender.
Truman only wanted to impress the Soviets.
Racist America used nukes against Asians but not against Germans.
A demonstration should have been made before destroying a city.
Blockade was preferable to bombing.

None of the foregoing assertions bear examination, to wit:

As British historian Max Hastings noted in Retribution (2008), "The myth that the Japanese were ready to surrender anyway has been so completely discredited by modern research that it is astonishing some writers continue to give it credence.” In researching Whirlwind, my volume on air operations over Japan, I found a wealth of Japanese testimony supporting Hastings’ conclusion. In 1943 Prime Minister Tojo admitted there was no viable plan to win the war, but hostilities continued. Admiral Onishi, the kamikaze master, asserted in March 1945 that the war had just begun. And a general staff officer told POWs that the war would last at least until 1948. 

Furthermore, the war cabinet’s actions give 0.00 credence to the notion that Japan was about to surrender. Tokyo rebuffed the allies’ Potsdam declaration calling for capitulation, and then sought intervention by the Soviets, who already planned to invade the Kurile Islands! There is no documentation that any of the eight men ruling Japan (including the emperor) stated before Hiroshima that they would have surrendered under any circumstances—not even when some were on trial for their lives. None stated that Soviet entry--plus some guarantee of the imperial system--would have moved them individually, much less triggered the necessary set of actions within the cabinet, that would have ended the war before the atoms were loosed. Two weeks before Hiroshima, Tokyo’s ambassador to Moscow said the best possible outcome was capitulation, perhaps with some guarantee of the emperor’s status—a situation rejected by the foreign minister and known by U.S. intelligence at the time.

So: if Tokyo was “about to surrender anyway” why did Hirohito have to over-ride his warlords? 

Harry Truman’s presumed intention to cow the Soviets with the nukes is another unsupportable contention. As commander in chief his first obligation was to the American forces facing a horrific invasion. Forcing Japan to surrender soonest was Job One, and any geopolitical fallout (!) was a tertiary concern if it was ever discussed at all. 

I encountered the “racism” mantra in college, and it still arises from the moldy PC pond. No less an authority than Malcolm X (!) stated that America would not use nukes against whites—a bald lie when the entire Manhattan Project was spurred by the German nuclear program. Colonel Paul Tibbets’ 509th Composite Group originally was instructed to conduct a dual strike: Germany and Japan. But “the weapon” was not available until July 1945, over two months after Germany surrendered. (When I noted that fact, the tweedy prof merely scrawled, “Are you sure?” and gave me a B+.)

Dropping a demonstration bomb was considered but rejected on at least two counts: it might be a dud, which would only reinforce Tokyo’s resolve; and there existed material for only two weapons at the time. Besides, there were in fact two demonstrations before Japan surrendered: at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

That leaves blockade which, short of invasion, was the only option other than declaring peace and going home. But as my colleague Rich Frank has observed in Downfall (1999), blockade would have killed far more people than the two A-bombs. Precious time would have passed, with at least hundreds of thousands of Japanese starving to death, plus millions more dead in Asia. As it was, perhaps 100,000 died there every month from famine, disease, and Japanese brutality. I have yet to see any critic even mention that fact. And it does not count the American KIAs sustaining a blockade—a cost that nuke critics seem willing to ignore.

So, here’s the deal:

You are Harry Truman in early August 1945. You have responsibility for ending a war that has killed nearly 400,000 Americans, with many thousands more to die in an invasion. Your military is divided on the subject: the Army under the megalomaniacal General Douglas MacArthur favors invasion while the Navy, which understands the human cost, opposes it. You know from intelligence sources that Tokyo is nowhere near capitulation. The daily cost of hostilities runs in the thousands 

You face an enemy unlike any in American history. You have seen the films of mothers throwing their infants off Saipan’s cliffs and jumping after them. You know that Tokyo is impervious to civilian suffering: after Curt LeMay’s B-29s burned down one-seventh of the city and killed at least 85,000 people one night in March, the war cabinet never flinched. You know that the government has closed schools and conscripted most of the civilian population into “volunteer” resistance units.

Now your scientists present you with the ultimate weapon bearing the potential for convincing the samurai zealots in Tokyo to “bear the unbearable.” If you decline that option and the invasion proceeds, eventually the parents of tens of thousands of GIs, Marines, and sailors will demand to know why you sent their sons to their deaths. You may or may not be lynched, but you definitely will be impeached.

What do you do?

It’s the lingering question whenever The Nuke Season rolls around.

THAT BUMP IN THE NIGHT

 

A few years ago around bedtime our security alarm went BEEEP.

 

I got the AR-15 with attached light just in case the electricity failed, but I left the interior lights on.  I briefly considered venturing outside but then thought....

 

Whatever-whomever's out there will see me back lighted and they'll be in darkness, Maglight or not.

 

So we called 911.  

 

I swear, in two minutes the PD had a helicopter overhead, scanning with its searchlight.  The gal at Dispatch was marvelous—calm, focused, even a bit funny.

 

Air One reported nothing visible.

 

Dispatch said two officers would arrive shortly.  I asked for a name.  She provided one.  (Separate story, see below.)

Doorbell rang and I played Whodat thru the door.

 

"Officer Stimpson."

 

Correctomundo.

 

We checked the perimeter (I being unarmed then) and found nothing.  Opened the electrical panel and...

 

A magnet had failed, allowing the alarm circuit to close.  Hence the BEEEP.

 

All was cool. 

 

Separate Story:

 

I asked where Officer Stimpson was from, and he said Utah.  I said dog-gone one of my best Navy ace friends was a Stimpson from Utah.  No relation that we could discern.  

 

Semi-semi related: Charlie Stimpson (16 kills) sported a Victory Model .38 with imitation bone grips.  Somewhere I may have a color pic.  One of his squadron mates (semi-POW of the Vichy French in Saigon) said he preferred the .38 and I asked why.  He said, "Have you ever carried a .45 all day?"  I confessed that yes, I have, but didn't go into details.

 

Anyway…

 

I take the threat of home invasion seriously.  One of my cherished friends—a two-war Marine Corps veteran--was murdered by a teenage POS who broke in late one night, demanding car keys.  The deputy who called to inform me said that the “suspect” was from a logging family with criminal backgrounds.  That came as no surprise—I’ve dealt with the type.

 

The murderer was tried and sentenced to death but then Oregon’s POS leftist governor suspended all death sentences for the remainder of his term.  (That governor later resigned in what passes for “disgrace” among Democrats.  The next Demogovernor commuted all death sentences to life.)

 

The trend continues.  Just this week during a crowded public safety meeting in Encino, California, police responded to two nearby residential break-ins.  The meeting was spurred by increased home invasions, notably the double murder of TV personalities this month.

 

A philosophical aside:

 

There are two kinds of people: grass eaters and meat eaters.

Or…there are copers and non-copers.

 

Both varieties are easily found on internet forums, usually preceded by libs who whine (and I’m quoting here) “Why don’t gun owners leave the house during a burglary?  Are their possessions more important than a life?”

 

Well, snowflake, consider this:

 

How much value does a criminal who invades your home place on his life?

 

Never thought of that did you?

 

No, of course not.

 

Yet  frequently the bleat arises again: “Why doesn’t somebody do something?”

 

Well, why don’t you do something like getting a gun and learning how to use it?

 

During the LA riots in 1992, some well-known entertainers sidled up to film writer-director and NRA board member John Milius (Dirty Harry, Conan, Apocalypse Now, Wind and the Lion, etc.) asking to borrow one of his firearms.  Reputedly he replied, “They’re all being used.

 

Moral: get your own.  And learn how to use them.

 

So…back to the bump in the night.

 

I’m excerpting a couple of passages from a former California police professional, previously one of my editors:

 

“For my pistols, if I need a light, I just turn it on and leave it on. I also turn on all the lights in the house, outside lights, everything. No need to be sneaky because I'll be yelling to get out of my house or my dogs and I are going to kill you!

 

“Dry firing? Turn the light on and aim things at the target and dry fire. At the range? Do the same thing. If you haven't done it much, with some loads, the smoke really shows up in the light and messes things up. Best to see that in person before you do it for real!

 

“My fighting guns are all iron sights. But two lights on the rifle, a light on each pistol.  The AR is a flat top, pencil barrel, old school fixed GI buttstock (I've had the collapsible ones collapse). 

 

I always also have two lights in my pockets. I've been in the dark before! I once started a felony hot stop with my early Streamlight. It died. Then I went to my backup light I had on my gunbelt. It died. Then I finally ended it using a small pocket light I had. 

 

“And I can speak from personal experience, when I pulled my gun on bad guys, my eyes were on the bad guy, not on the sights. Yes, I was indexing the gun, looking over the sights, but there would have been zero time to "transition to irons" if needed. It's silly stuff touted by people who don't know the real world. I agree, they're dandy for competition.

 

“But just that.”

Turning Point: Midway or Guadalcanal?

 

 World War II historians frequently discuss (alright, argue) which 1942 battle was The Turning Point in the Pacific War.  It’s a subject that naturally arises every June, and this year is the 83^rd anniversary of Midway, leading to Guadalcanal in August.

 

There are reasons for supporting either candidate as the turning point, although the subject is a duality.  The mutual relationship between Midway and Guadalcanal needs to be recognized and analyzed.  In either instance, the same players emerge as vital.

 

In the months after Pearl Harbor, we could not have prosecuted the war against Imperial Japan without two players:

 

The Douglas SBD Dauntless scout-bomber

And

USS Enterprise (CV-6).

 

Both were indispensable, and both were elements of the binary leading to victory.

 

Full disclosure:

 

I am an SBD evangelist.  It was the subject of my first book (The Dauntless Dive Bomber in WW II, Naval Institute 1976); an Osprey “Combat Aircraft” volume; and a novel (Dauntless: A Novel of Midway and Guadalcanal, Bantam 1992.)  The process began in 1972 when my father obtained the world’s only flying Dauntless (actually an Army A-24B) which we restored as an SBD-5.  By 1974 I logged about eight happy hours in the gunner’s seat—absolutely the best kind of historical research.

 

Before and after, my history circle included a stellar cast of SBD pilots, beginning with Rear Admiral Jig Dog Ramage at NAS Whidbey Island in 1967.  He led Enterprise’s Bombing Squadron 10 at the Philippine Sea battle, becoming a cherished friend.  Other SBD alumni included Rear Admiral Max Leslie and Captain Stanley “Swede” Vejtasa of Yorktown (CV-5) plus Lieutenant Commander Richard H. Best, Rear Admiral Martin “Red” Carmody, Commander Robert D. Gibson, and Vice Admiral William I. Martin, all of Enterprise.

 

Several years ago I wrote a Naval History article titled “The Plane that Won the War.”  I laid out the case (irrefutable, I might add) that without the Dauntless, the U.S. Navy would have lost the war in 1942.  The only option was the obsolete Vought SB2U Vindicator—merely 260 were built--and its only combat was land-based at Midway where it sustained severe losses without inflicting damage. 

 

At Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal SBDs sank in whole or in part six Japanese carriers, all in a six-month period.  Torpedo bombers only contributed to destruction of two of those ships.

 

The next-generation dive bomber was Curtiss’ trouble-plagued SB2C Helldiver, which did enter combat until November 1943.  And the Helldiver did not fully replace carrier-based Dauntlesses until after the 1944 Marianas battle.  That was another June milepost for the SBD, cementing its record as the only U.S. carrier aircraft engaged in the first five carrier clashes.

 

So: which was the turning point?  Midway or Guadalcanal?

 

My friend and colleague Richard B. Frank laid out a solid case in his definitive 800-page study, Guadalcanal (Random House, 1990).  He cites a Japanese naval historian who said, “There were many famous battles…but we only talked about two: Midway and Guadalcanal.”

 

In fairness, we should acknowledge the linkage between the Coral Sea battle of early May 1942 and Midway four weeks later.  In the world’s first aircraft carrier engagement, both sides lost a flattop, and Japan’s thrust toward Port Morseby, New Guinea, was deterred.  Two imperial carriers were removed from the potential Midway lineup, and USS Yorktown (CV-5) was hastily repaired to sortie in time for her fateful rendezvous.

 

Midway was Japan’s last strategic offensive, a crucial U.S. victory that ended Japan’s momentum.  The Imperial Navy never mounted another major operation except in response to U.S. and Allied initiatives, notably in the Solomons, Marianas, and Philippines. 

 

But what if Japan had won at Midway?  What would that mean?

 

Most histories focus on Japan’s loss of four carriers at Midway, which certainly blunted Japan’s offensive potential.  However, at the sanguinary Battle of Santa Cruz north of the Solomons in October, the Imperial Navy lost more aircrew than at Midway. 

 

Seizing Midway Atoll would have posed immense problems for Tokyo.  Sustaining a remote garrison 1,100 miles from Oahu looks like Mission Impossible, given the distances involved and strained logistics support.  Meanwhile, the geo-strategic clock was ticking as American industry spooled up, producing the next generation of ships, aircraft, and personnel that began arriving in 1943.

 

Midway was a four-day battle (at most) versus a sapping, sanguinary six-month campaign at Guadalcanal.  The scales of engagement bear no similarity, but the raw numbers make a poor comparison.  What counts more is the strategic effect: an end to Japanese victories at Midway and America’s first offensive of the war at Guadalcanal.  But without Midway, Guadalcanal lacks impetus.

 

The difference between Admiral Chester Nimitz’s spectacular win at Midway and loss of that battle was measured downstream.  Additional months of relentless, grinding Pacific warfare meant tens of thousands of additional U.S. and Allied casualties.

 

Meanwhile, American retention of Midway was not a direct factor in launching Operation Watchtower in the Solomons that August.  But loss of two or more carriers at Midway definitely would have affected Nimitz’s ability to support the Guadalcanal landings.

 

However, here’s the short version: without the “incredible victory” at Midway, America still would have deployed atomic bombs, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet still would have dropped anchor in Tokyo Bay, certainly in 1946. 

 

Reverting to my Dauntless devotion, sometimes I still re-read Edward P. Stafford’s marvelous The Big E prose describing the SBDs rolling into their 70-degree dives over Admiral Nagumo’s carriers on the morning of June 4:

 

“In a dive bomber’s dream of perfection, the clean blue Dauntlesses—with their perforated dive flaps open at the trailing edges of their wings and their big bombs tucked tight and pointing home—the pilots straining forward, rudder-feet and stick-hands light and delicate, getting it just right as the yellow decks came up, left hands that would reach down and forward to release now resting on the cockpit edge, gunners lying on their backs behind the cocked twin barrels searching for the fighters that did not come—carved a moment out of eternity for man to remember forever.”