Turning Point: Midway or Guadalcanal?

 

 World War II historians frequently discuss (alright, argue) which 1942 battle was The Turning Point in the Pacific War.  It’s a subject that naturally arises every June, and this year is the 83^rd anniversary of Midway, leading to Guadalcanal in August.

 

There are reasons for supporting either candidate as the turning point, although the subject is a duality.  The mutual relationship between Midway and Guadalcanal needs to be recognized and analyzed.  In either instance, the same players emerge as vital.

 

In the months after Pearl Harbor, we could not have prosecuted the war against Imperial Japan without two players:

 

The Douglas SBD Dauntless scout-bomber

And

USS Enterprise (CV-6).

 

Both were indispensable, and both were elements of the binary leading to victory.

 

Full disclosure:

 

I am an SBD evangelist.  It was the subject of my first book (The Dauntless Dive Bomber in WW II, Naval Institute 1976); an Osprey “Combat Aircraft” volume; and a novel (Dauntless: A Novel of Midway and Guadalcanal, Bantam 1992.)  The process began in 1972 when my father obtained the world’s only flying Dauntless (actually an Army A-24B) which we restored as an SBD-5.  By 1974 I logged about eight happy hours in the gunner’s seat—absolutely the best kind of historical research.

 

Before and after, my history circle included a stellar cast of SBD pilots, beginning with Rear Admiral Jig Dog Ramage at NAS Whidbey Island in 1967.  He led Enterprise’s Bombing Squadron 10 at the Philippine Sea battle, becoming a cherished friend.  Other SBD alumni included Rear Admiral Max Leslie and Captain Stanley “Swede” Vejtasa of Yorktown (CV-5) plus Lieutenant Commander Richard H. Best, Rear Admiral Martin “Red” Carmody, Commander Robert D. Gibson, and Vice Admiral William I. Martin, all of Enterprise.

 

Several years ago I wrote a Naval History article titled “The Plane that Won the War.”  I laid out the case (irrefutable, I might add) that without the Dauntless, the U.S. Navy would have lost the war in 1942.  The only option was the obsolete Vought SB2U Vindicator—merely 260 were built--and its only combat was land-based at Midway where it sustained severe losses without inflicting damage. 

 

At Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal SBDs sank in whole or in part six Japanese carriers, all in a six-month period.  Torpedo bombers only contributed to destruction of two of those ships.

 

The next-generation dive bomber was Curtiss’ trouble-plagued SB2C Helldiver, which did enter combat until November 1943.  And the Helldiver did not fully replace carrier-based Dauntlesses until after the 1944 Marianas battle.  That was another June milepost for the SBD, cementing its record as the only U.S. carrier aircraft engaged in the first five carrier clashes.

 

So: which was the turning point?  Midway or Guadalcanal?

 

My friend and colleague Richard B. Frank laid out a solid case in his definitive 800-page study, Guadalcanal (Random House, 1990).  He cites a Japanese naval historian who said, “There were many famous battles…but we only talked about two: Midway and Guadalcanal.”

 

In fairness, we should acknowledge the linkage between the Coral Sea battle of early May 1942 and Midway four weeks later.  In the world’s first aircraft carrier engagement, both sides lost a flattop, and Japan’s thrust toward Port Morseby, New Guinea, was deterred.  Two imperial carriers were removed from the potential Midway lineup, and USS Yorktown (CV-5) was hastily repaired to sortie in time for her fateful rendezvous.

 

Midway was Japan’s last strategic offensive, a crucial U.S. victory that ended Japan’s momentum.  The Imperial Navy never mounted another major operation except in response to U.S. and Allied initiatives, notably in the Solomons, Marianas, and Philippines. 

 

But what if Japan had won at Midway?  What would that mean?

 

Most histories focus on Japan’s loss of four carriers at Midway, which certainly blunted Japan’s offensive potential.  However, at the sanguinary Battle of Santa Cruz north of the Solomons in October, the Imperial Navy lost more aircrew than at Midway. 

 

Seizing Midway Atoll would have posed immense problems for Tokyo.  Sustaining a remote garrison 1,100 miles from Oahu looks like Mission Impossible, given the distances involved and strained logistics support.  Meanwhile, the geo-strategic clock was ticking as American industry spooled up, producing the next generation of ships, aircraft, and personnel that began arriving in 1943.

 

Midway was a four-day battle (at most) versus a sapping, sanguinary six-month campaign at Guadalcanal.  The scales of engagement bear no similarity, but the raw numbers make a poor comparison.  What counts more is the strategic effect: an end to Japanese victories at Midway and America’s first offensive of the war at Guadalcanal.  But without Midway, Guadalcanal lacks impetus.

 

The difference between Admiral Chester Nimitz’s spectacular win at Midway and loss of that battle was measured downstream.  Additional months of relentless, grinding Pacific warfare meant tens of thousands of additional U.S. and Allied casualties.

 

Meanwhile, American retention of Midway was not a direct factor in launching Operation Watchtower in the Solomons that August.  But loss of two or more carriers at Midway definitely would have affected Nimitz’s ability to support the Guadalcanal landings.

 

However, here’s the short version: without the “incredible victory” at Midway, America still would have deployed atomic bombs, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet still would have dropped anchor in Tokyo Bay, certainly in 1946. 

 

Reverting to my Dauntless devotion, sometimes I still re-read Edward P. Stafford’s marvelous The Big E prose describing the SBDs rolling into their 70-degree dives over Admiral Nagumo’s carriers on the morning of June 4:

 

“In a dive bomber’s dream of perfection, the clean blue Dauntlesses—with their perforated dive flaps open at the trailing edges of their wings and their big bombs tucked tight and pointing home—the pilots straining forward, rudder-feet and stick-hands light and delicate, getting it just right as the yellow decks came up, left hands that would reach down and forward to release now resting on the cockpit edge, gunners lying on their backs behind the cocked twin barrels searching for the fighters that did not come—carved a moment out of eternity for man to remember forever.”

GUNS IN SCHOOLS--AGAIN

 Northeastern Oregon c. 1905-1910.

First day of class in the one-room school, a male teacher appeared.  Most unusual.  He wore a three-piece suit, prompting some youthful rowdies to anticipate a fun year.

Without saying anything, the educator walked to the blackboard, drew a three-inch circle in chalk, and paced to the back of the room.  He produced a derringer from his vest, took aim, and placed both rounds inside the circle.  Without comment he reloaded, returned the gat to his pocket, and took his place up front.

“Good morning, class.  I am Mr. Smith (?).  Shall we begin?”

Yes indeed.  Especially effective when Recess often involved horse races and shooting matches.

Fast-forward five or six decades, same locale.  My 120-student high school’s parking lot featured pickups with gun racks in the rear windows, showing rifles and/or shotguns.  

Also, I recall that Friday afternoon before deer season was an excused absence, though maybe just for seniors.  There was never (ever) a Gun Problem.

But I’ll add a semi-related sidebar:

One year the Girls League unknowingly scheduled The Dance for opening of deer season.

Some boyfriends were disappointed.

so...

Next year Girls League made a significant change...

And hit opening weekend of elk season!

Bird seasons—notably pheasant—posed no conflicts since ample daylight remained after school let out.

So how to explain the difference between Then and Now?

What’s missing from the equations is culture.  Or what passes for culture.

Typically U.S. school shootings are perpetrated by “troubled youths” with mental issues and poor parenting, sometimes aggravated by drug use.  Add frequent gang connections, and we’re faced with a toxic brew.  

Not directly related to school shootings, but still instructive: in the 1980s the NRA developed the “Eddie Eagle” program, a simple process to reduce children’s risks around firearms.

“Stop!  Leave the area! “Tell an adult!”

Predictably, the liberal establishment denounced the concept as “a lobbying tool.”  By that warped logic, driver’s education could be criticized as a way to advertise automobiles.

We have sex education, but in recent years it’s frequently slanted toward “gender” advocacies, often over parental objections.  The double standard hardly could be clearer.

None of the foregoing should surprise anyone.  Historically, National Education Association political donations are 80 to 95 percent for Democrats.

NEA critics have noted that “educators” appear far less concerned with protecting students than with advancing an anti-gun political agenda.  A journalism adage long has stated, “If it bleeds, it leads.”  That’s certainly true with crime reporting.

Over There

In foreign nations, the record of school shootings varies widely.

Wikipedia’s only entry on Israel school shootings occurred in 1956, when six civilians were killed before residents could arm themselves.  Other sources cite six incidents without specifics.  At any rate, the incidence over so long a period is almost zero.

Meanwhile, apparently there has never been a school shooting in Switzerland, where military arms commonly are held.  Sixteen-year-old students compete with adults in rifle matches, and tourists remark on youngsters biking with rifles slung over their shoulders.

Yet in Europe, socialists delight in splitting statistical hairs:

“Compared to the U.S., Israel has only had half a dozen attacks on its schools. Therefore, the claim that there are no shootings isn’t exactly true.”

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/09/misleading-post-claims-there-are-no-shootings-in-israel-despite-teens-with-guns

In Russia in 2004, 330 people were killed in a two-day school attack by thirty-two Chechen-linked terrorists.  All but one of the killers was slain.  Seven years later Russian courts blamed authorities, police and the military for poor security, also citing irresponsible methods by responders who used explosives and flame throwers.

==

Those opposed to defending schools reflexively dismiss the NRA mantra, “The way to stop a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun.”

That liberal argument clearly is disingenuous BECAUSE TEACHERS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO CARRY FIREARMS.

Furthermore, few schools have credible security, and the police response record is miserable.

Columbine High, Colorado, 1999.  Two “troubled youths” went on a killing spree and ignored the cops gathered outside, pointing guns at the building.  Thirteen victims were killed before the murders suicided.  Subsequently a SWAT commander admitted on live TV that he delayed entry because of concerns about friendly fire.

Parents sued the sheriff’s office and school district but lost on basis of government immunity.  (In other words, zero accountability.) Subsequently survivors successfully sued the killers’ parents.

Uvalde, Texas, 2022.  A teenaged sociopath shot nearly 40 people before police killed him almost 90 minutes after the slaughter began.  The state’s investigation cited “systemic failures and egregiously poor decision making,” adding that police “failed to adhere to their active shooter training.”

The obvious (?) way to reduce school shootings—and the number of casualties—is to maintain security personnel on campus.  But “school resource officers” (perish-forbid they should be called “armed guards”) are not always available, or affordable.

What to do?

Well, I’m glad you asked.  Because here’s the answer:

Armed teachers.  Or administrators.  Or janitors.

The advantages should be obvious.  School staffers are present all day, every day, at no extra cost.  One may not be enough, depending on school size, so consider two or more in overlapping schedules.

That’s assuming, of course, that enough teachers are willing to enroll in a program.  If not, then antigun educators can try hiding or fleeing until men with guns arrive to solve the problem.  

Armed teachers should pass a minimal training course, however defined.  It would have more to do with awareness and decision-making than purely shooting because usually the marksmanship problem is minimal.  Proficiency with the relevant handgun should be demonstrated at least twice a year, if only for liability purposes.

What sidearm to use?  It doesn’t matter a lot.  A five- or six-shot revolver is adequate, even without extra ammunition.  Or carry the ammo separately from the gun, perhaps in a speed loader.  That could be advantageous in some cases, lest students or assailants wrestle the gun away from the teacher.  If that occurred, the fewer rounds available could be better.

For semiautomatics, one magazine (perhaps downloaded for the above reason) would suffice.  Moreover, a semi has the additional advantage of carrying ammunition separately from the pistol, which can be loaded in less than five seconds.

Then there’s The Oops Factor.  Inevitably, some school guns will be misplaced.  

Here’s a partial list:

https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/news/police-and-security-officers-keep-leaving-their-guns-in-school-bathrooms/133499/

In 2016 an FBI truck in was robbed of guns and ammunition in Washington, D.C.  This year in San Francisco the FBI lost a van full of gear including hand grenades and ballistic vests.

In 2019 a Capitol Police lieutenant left his pistol in a restroom stall without consequences.  Two years later he murdered unarmed January 6 protestor Ashley Babbitt—without consequences. 

When guardians neglect to secure their guns, carrying ammunition separately should eliminate fatal consequences if the weapons are discovered and seized by assorted miscreants.

In short: there are options for arming teachers and/or staff that can—and should—override political agendas.  If in fact “It’s for the children.”

Captain Parker, Colonel Barrett and Our National DNA

 Listen, my children, and you shall hear

Of the midnight ride of Paul Revere,
On the eighteenth of April, in Seventy-Five:
Hardly a man is now alive 
Who remembers that famous day and year.

 

--Paul Revere’s Ride by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, 1860.

 

By the rude bridge that arched the flood,
    Their flag to April’s breeze unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood,
    And fired the shot heard round the world.

 

--Concord Hymn by Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1837.

 

Today is the 250^th anniversary of the start of the American Revolution.  We learned Longfellow and Emerson’s poems in grade school in a previous century, and I wonder if they are still taught today.  I suspect not often.

 

In any case, the Battles of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, are significant to me.  My mother was huge on genealogy, and joined the Daughters of the American Revolution on two ancestors--militia commanders Captain John Parker and Colonel James Barrett.  One of her cousins was named Parker Barrett.

 

Like so many colonists, John Parker regarded himself as an American rather than a Briton.  He was elected head of his militia company based on his experience in the French and Indian War.  Though fatally consumptive, he managed the strength to take the field on Lexington Common at the head of his 80 men, 12 miles west of Boston at dawn on April 19.  Militia units had been alerted by Paul Revere’s famous midnight ride, though others also raised the alarm.

 

A British column comprised of companies from ten regiments and a marine battalion was ordered to seize civilian arms.  As the regulars approached, Parker walked the line, advising his company, “Stand your ground.  Do not fire unless fired upon.  But if they mean to have a war, let it begin here.”

 

Someone—a nervous American or an ill-trained soldier—let off a round.  From there the 20^th century phrase took hold, “firing contagion.”  Vastly outnumbered, the militia retreated with Parker intending to regroup to the rear.

 

Eight patriots were killed, ages 25 to 63.  Honor their memories: John Brown, Samuel Hadley, Caleb Harrington, Jonathon Harrington, Robert Munroe, Isaac Muzzey, Asahel Porter, and Jonas Parker, Captain John’s cousin. Jonathon Harrington, fatally wounded, crawled home and died on his own doorstep.

 

Ten others were wounded.

 

From Lexington the 700-strong British marched six miles to Concord, focused on James Barrett’s farm.  The family was well established, having immigrated 137 years before.  Colonel Barrett’s rank was suitable to the strength of his command, some 400 minutemen and militia.  Anticipating the redcoats’ actions, arms and ammunition with two dismounted cannon were buried in his adjacent fields, largely escaping detection although supplies in town were discovered and destroyed.

 

 

This month’s American Rifleman has an excellent article by historian Joel Bohy.  He quotes 19-year-old Thaddeus Blood of Concord: “About 2 o’clock in the morning I was called out of bed by John Barritt a Sergt of the Militia Company which I belonged.  I joined the company under Capt. Nathan Barrett…at the old court house about 3 o’clock and was orerd to go into the court house to draw ammunition, after the company had all their amun we were paraded near the meeting house.”

 

With another militia unit, Barrett’s company set out for Lexington when the low sun gleamed off British bayonets, “making a noble appearance.”

 

Minuteman Amos Barrett, less literate than Thaddeus Blood, wrote, “Thair was in the town House a number of intrenchen tools with they carried out and Burnt them. At least they said it was better to Burn them in the house and set fire to then in the house, but our people Begd of them not to Burn the house, and put it out.  It wont long before it was set fire again but finally it warnt Burnt. Their was about 100 barrels of flower in Mr. Hubbards malt house, the rold that out an noked then to pieces and Rold some in the mill pond whitch was saved after they was goon.” 

 

The short battle was fought at relatively close range--across the Concord River the north bridge and approaches were only about 140 feet.  Typical of 18^th century warfare, the engagement was marked with the rattle of musketry and tang of black powder smoke obscuring much of the action.

 

But in the confused fighting in and around Concord, the British suffered from disjointed command, and withdrew, some in a panic, some captured inebriated.  

 

Thereafter the British retreat became a shooting gallery.  Hundreds of other Americans rushed to the scene, taking turns sniping at the redcoats on their long, dolorous retreat to Boston.

 

At day’s end 54 Americans were killed or missing with about 40 wounded.  The youngest killed was Edward Barber of Charlestown, just 14.

 

Of the 1,500 British engaged in the two battles and the withdrawal, 126 were killed or missing plus 174 known wounded for a total of 300.  The overall disparity was three to one in favor of the home team.

 

The most man in the fight was 78-year-old Samuel Whittemore, Jr.  A farmer, he saw the British relief column approaching (three regiments and a marine battalion) and resolved to do his part.  He ambushed a grenadier unit, shooting three soldiers with his musket and pistols.  Then, with his blood truly up, he drew a sword and charged.  His intended victims shot him in the face and bayonetted him repeatedly.  Left for dead, when found by other Americans he was trying to reload his musket.

 

Incredibly, Sam Whittemore died in 1793—ten years after America’s independence--at the exceptionally advanced age of 96.

 

Captain Parker died of tuberculosis that September at age 46.  Colonel Barrett died at 68 in 1779.  Paul Revere died in 1818.

 

Both poets died in 1882.  Longfellow took his last literary ride in March at age 75, and Emerson crossed the celestial bridge in April at 78, victim of TB as was John Parker.

 

Let it be noted:

The American Revolution leading to independence began with a government weapon confiscation scheme.  

 

That fact is embedded in our national DNA.  It should--but probably will not—raise cautionary hackles in some political circles.