A UKRAINE INVASION?

 

Ukraine is in the news daily owing to the persistent threat of Russian invasion.  But when reputedly only about two-thirds of younger Americans can identify the U.S.A. on a world map, some background may be helpful.

Depending on definitions, Ukraine is the fifth most populous nation in Europe, as the autonomous republics of Crimea and Sevastopol on the Black Sea boost the population from 41 to 48 million.  The latter figure is smaller than Italy (59 million) but larger than Poland (38 million).

At 603,000 square miles, Ukraine is the second largest of 51 European states in area, after Russia and ahead of France. It is bounded by Russia some 1,400 miles from southeast to northeast; Belarus to the north; Poland, Slovakia and Hungary to the west ; and Romania to the southwest.

The Ukrainian language is distinct from Russian although both use the Cyrillic alphabet with minor differences.  A friend who grew up speaking both compares them to Spanish and Italian.

Russia and China are Ukraine’s major trade partners, as exports include iron and steel, grain, electronics and computers.  Two of Russia’s major sources of helicopter engines are Ukrainian.  

With the foregoing in mind, here’s a combined assessment from two learned commentators: George Mellinger, one of the leading Western scholars on the Soviet and Russian military; and my brother John who took Russian studies at Stanford and toured the Warsaw Bloc from Oxford.

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It is that old damned concept of Spheres of Influence. We proclaimed ours with the Monroe Doctrine, and later the Zimmerman Telegram incident. And even more sharply with Cuba since 1959. And again in Grenada 1983. It is our right, and one we should be invoking in Venezuela and Central America. Every nation asserts its sphere where it can. And needs to know its boundaries. The culture, religion, and history of Russia and Ukraine place them together. At the same time, NATO, formerly defensive, has become aggressively expansionist. Like Macedon in the 3rd Century BC, the Mongols, Bonaparte, and the Soviet Empire, NATO pursues its momentum of success.  In fact, even the new United States followed the principle with several thwarted attempts to expand into Canada.

 

What would be the consequence if NATO were to succeed in defending Ukraine? Surely it would be necessary to incorporate Ukraine and reclaim Crimea, which would become a 21st Century analogue of Alsace-Lorraine. 

The Georgian conflict of 2008 and the recent Armenian-Azeri war would surely offer yet another need for further spread. Not to mention an urge to spread Western Enlightenment northward into Russia's "soft underbelly.”  As they used to say, ”Bearing the European Man's burden.”  And that is assuming NATO succeeds.

 

What will Putin do, and what is his intent? A good chess player makes both defensive and offensive moves, and a great one plays so that his moves are both simultaneously.

While we hear about Putin's 130,000 troops along the fronts, Ukrainian President Zelensky's forces supposedly number 250,000, though it appears Russia's are better organized and equipped, but with very weak logistics and supply capabilities.

To borrow a trope, Russia's Army appears overwhelmingly capable on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, and totally incompetent on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. That is "the fun challenge" of war both as a game and reality. You only find out with the actual engagement.

 

Some westerners anticipate that Ukraine would become "Putin's Vietnam.” If Russia were to occupy Western Ukraine that is a distinct possibility. The Ukrainian National Army maintained an active, armed resistance from the end of 1944 until 1962, and that was against Stalin and Khrushchev, either of whose brutality contrasts against Putin's relative restraint. 

However, in a hypothetical war, a NATO "liberation" of Luhansk, Donbas, and Crimea could well prove to be "NATO's Vietnam.” It has already proven for the past seven years to be "Ukraine's Vietnam,” which I do not expect my earlier "NATO Success" scenario to actually occur. It’s that old rule of dog's fighting best on their own turf.

And here I'd like to venture an analogy with Africa. When the European colonial empires decolonized during the 1960s, the national boundaries of the new African nations were drawn according to the lines of the old colonial possessions with scant regard for cultural and tribal realities, often dividing tribes between nations while uniting hostile tribes together in the same nation. 

Something analogous happened after the collapse of the old, little-lamented Russian Empire. Lenin and Stalin started reshuffling the cards trying to assure that it would be impossible for the various Soviet Socialist Republics to ever disentangle themselves. That sort of worked so long as you had a tyrant ruler, but when it came apart, it became a real dog's breakfast, much like a full scale copy of the Yugoslav test model. Hell, the first Armenian-Azeri war, and several clashes in Central Asia among different flavors of Turk and Iranian neighborhoods began even before Boris Yeltsin.  There are many millions of people in this world who who have absolutely no willingness to be Mister Rogers' neighbor.

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Deploying 8,500 US troops to Poland and Romania, plus new sanctions, are unlikely to deter Putin, should he decide it's in his best interests to invade Ukraine.

Ukraine's active ground forces numbered 169,000 in 2016, but probably more than that now.  Most of them, however, are tied down are tied down in the Donbas.  Its independent air assault forces contain seven brigades, plus support units. 

Ukrainian brigades are unlikely to be fully manned.  Still, being generous, those decent troops could total 20,000.  Special operations forces are credited with 4,000.  The air force and navy add 45,000 and 6,500 active personnel.  Thus, today presumably Ukraine could field 250,000 active armed forces members.  It's also building up its citizen territorial defense force though some are training with wooden weapons and may not be ready for a winter invasion.

Putin wouldn't invade with just 100,000 ground troops.  He'd probably beef up that number substantially, to an estimated 100 battalion tactical groups, i.e., 33 brigade-equivalents or 11 divisions.  Plus airborne and naval infantry.  Add in his overwhelming air and seapower, and Ukraine doesn't stand a chance, in my chairborne ranger opinion.

Russia probably lacks sufficient logistical train to sustain thrusts up to ten likely avenues of attack, but it doesn't need to.  Just reinforce those armored columns that make the best progress.  

Russian maneuver brigades are unlike any other such formations in the world.  They have as many self-propelled gun-howitzer, multiple rocket and antitank missile and artillery battalions as they have tank and mechanized infantry.  Plus two air defense battalions, one all SAM and the other a mix of AAA and missiles, like the antitank battalion.  A U.S. brigade has just one howitzer battalion and no AT or AD battalions.  But all this firepower requires trucks to keep the batteries supplied.  The Russians might ease their logistics problems by leaving several anti-air units behind.

An invasion might begin with seizing the Black Sea coast with a drive out of Crimea, supported by naval infantry, to deprive Ukraine of resupply by sea.  On the first night, Russian airborne troops could seize all Dnepr bridges and dams.  Attacking out of Belarus, Russian forces could cut off Kyiv in days, and shut down its power in overnight.  Columns south and north of the Donbas would aim to encircle the bulk of Ukraine's army there.  Other columns would aim to relieve the airborne troops on the Dniepr.

Presuming the almost certain Russian victory, then what? Guerrilla conflict is a possibility, especially if supported by NATO member states.

Meanwhile, let us keep our eyes on the geo-strategic horizon.  China claims the whole world as its sphere of influence, and a Russian-occupied Ukraine would not alter that fact.

THE TAIWAN TRIGGER

 

A potential clash between Communist China (the Peoples Republic or PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan, of the ROC) has gained persistent media attention of late.  It’s an old story with legs, as the prospects ebbed and flowed from year to year.  

For a bit of background, readers of this blog may recall my previous comments, including these:

From February 2011

“Beijing has considerable internal problems to address before embarking on the road to conquest.  China’s unemployment rate has remained steady at around 4 percent for over a decade.  That’s the good news.  The bad news: The Middle Kingdom now must find some 30 million new jobs per year to maintain that figure.  That’s essential for for growing the middle class, which is necessary to bolster the internal economy without relying so heavily on foreign markets.  (And if that sounds suspiciously non-communist, you’re right.  Nobody said that politics has to make sense.)

“China’s internal situation is a complex subject owing to economic and demographic concerns.  I already cited the need to generate some 30 million new jobs annually.  That figure keeps popping up.  It’s also the number of young single men who are unlikely to marry owing to the long-term single-child policy.”

http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/opinion/chinas-30-million-bachelors/story-e6frerdf-1111116459631

“As stated my Aussie mate Peter (an army veteran whose company does business in the PRC), ‘That’s a lot of surplus infantry.’”

However, from September 2014:

“Today the military-industrial complex’s go-to bogeyman is China, which is not about to start a war with its number one trade partner.  That feud would destroy both economies, but the Pentagon and the pols need somebody as an excuse for buying platinum-plated stealth airplanes and submarines.”

However, That Was Then and This Is Now.

China’s massive hacking of U.S. government and industry networks largely has come and gone in public awareness.  Here’s one quick survey:

https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/china-another-hack-us-cybersecurity-issues-mount-rcna744

And here's another revelation spanning a three-year period:

https://money.cnn.com/2016/07/13/technology/china-fdic-hack/index.html

America’s erratic China policies have swung on the geopolitical pendulum.  In 1972 Republican President Richard Nixon amazed the world by visiting Mao tse Tung, and in 1979 Democrat Jimmy Carter recognized Beijing.  The Democrat Clinton administration’s contradictory 1990s positions on human rights and most-favored-nation status continued the diplomatic roller coaster.  

https://www.heritage.org/report/the-collapse-clintons-china-policy-undoing-the-damage-the-mfn-debate

For years China has been our number one trade partner, after the European Union.  And what card-carrying capitalist could pass up one-sixth of the world’s population? Especially with low-low manufacturing costs despite transpacific shipping expense.  But President Donald Trump imposed much higher tariffs on Chinese imports to reduce the U.S. trade deficit.  Then America’s lopsided reliance on the PRC belatedly came to the fore with the 2020 pandemic.

Beyond economics, Beijing has spent decades gaining influence in the U.S., positioning itself for broad-based advantage.  As noted, industrial-grade cyber attacks have largely gone unanswered, and Chinese have inserted themselves in business, universities, and government.  Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s communications director was a registered agent of Communist China, and California Senator Diane Feinstein’s driver for 20 years was a Chinese operative.

https://iotwreport.com/top-pelosi-staffer-registered-as-foreign-agent-to-lobby-for-chinese-state-media-outlet/

https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2018/08/01/details-chinese-spy-dianne-feinstein-san-francisco/

Through the decades, Beijing has waged an extremely patient, broad-based approach to expanding its influence.  It’s not always according to diplomatic norms.  Sometimes PRC officials resort to physical force, demonstrating their attitude with incidents against Fiji and New Guinea.  

Meanwhile, the PRC claims international waters as its own, even building islands in the South China Sea while engaged in a massive naval buildup.  Combined with growing influence in Africa and South America, clearly Beijing has a holistic approach to global dominance.

Which returns us to war against Taiwan.

Despite the diplomatic rift, he U.S. has continued political and military connections with Taiwan.  Among my D.C. contacts is a military analyst who has traveled in the PRC and ROC.  He notes the immense importance of “face” in Asian politics, both internal and external.  (America lost enormous “face,” or credibility, with the Afghan debacle last year but continued with business as usual.)  Therefore, it’s almost certain that Beijing would not attack Taiwan with anything less than total commitment; the cost of failure would be unbearable in the PRC.  Some observers opine that it might even upset the Communist Party’s totalitarian grasp.

Would the U.S. and other Pacific nations physically oppose a PRC invasion of Taiwan?  It’s far from certain, though standing by while issuing Strong Diplomatic Objections seems more likely at present.  Certainly the Princes of the Potomac would gauge the public pulse, determining whether the electorate would endorse military action supporting a nation that many Americans could not identify on a world map.

Naval analysts note that the 100-mile stretch of the Taiwan Strait imposes a serious challenge to an invader.  The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (!) is expanding its amphibious capability to accomplish a forced landing against a nation that has been preparing for war since 1949.  However, if Beijing decides to press the trigger anytime soon, probably dedicated ‘phibs would be augmented by non-specialized or modified ships to deliver infantry and armor divisions to Taiwanese beaches.

Regardless of how well planned and coordinated, it’s extremely unlikely that a PRC invasion could achieve surprise.  The necessary buildup of  an invasion fleet would be noticed by “overhead coverage” (read: satellites) almost immediately.  Rating high on China’s priority would be minesweepers—lots of them with constant overhead fighter protection.  Today Taiwan is belatedly investing in more minelayers and attack submarines with fast missile-firing corvettes.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/taiwan-making-major-investment-mines-deter-china-193238

However, considering the huge disparity of forces—notably manpower and airpower—Taiwan probably would face a losing battle, absent outside support.  Even “severe” diplomatic responses such as trade embargoes would be irrelevant during the fighting.  We can expect a unified assault, integrating sea, air, land, and cyber forces toward a common goal.

Aside from completing a seven-decade ambition to “reunite” China, Beijing may envision other benefits.  Taiwan produces a large share of the world’s computer chips.  If the PRC grabs the ROC, Beijing stands to increase its market share.  However, reportedly Taiwan has determined to destroy its production plants in event of invasion.  Meanwhile, TSMC, which controls one-fourth of the global market, is building two microchip factories in the U.S.  

War over Taiwan could adversely affect the PRC in other ways.  Communist china imports huge quantities of crude oil, far more than any nation.  We’ve been there before: in 1941 Japan went to war against the West to secure the petrowealth of the Dutch East Indies.  We know how that turned out.

During a war, and probably sometime thereafter, no tankers could arrive from the Persian Gulf.  China would have to rely on pipelines from Russia, themselves sitting ducks.  Simultaneously, there would be little or no power for coal or gas from abroad.  Meanwhile, Beijing also imports electrical machinery, ores and plastics—all necessary for manufacturing.

Some pundits posit a global coordinated plan with China against Taiwan, Russia against Ukraine, and Iran against anybody.  If they were timed together, the impact would be enormous at every level.

When? 

Well, a retired military officer says, “All our adversaries are strong, ruthless leaders; all can see and assess the weakness in the U.S. leadership.  I remain in my expectation with others that we are going to see turmoil throughout the globe after the Olympics.”  (To be held in China throughout February.)

In domestic U.S. politics, successful invasions of Ukraine and Taiwan, with likely negative impact on the stock market, supply chains and inflation, could drop President Biden's job approval from the present 35 to 40% or even down to VP Harris' 25%, dooming Democrats in both the House and Senate, regardless of long-term fraud dating from Lyndon Johnson’s era.

Is America prepared for the consequences of defending Taiwan—and losing?  The answer is No.  Very few Americans are even aware of the question.

Presumably Pacific nations would not allow the violent conquest of Taiwan, lest it set a long-term pattern.  So: assuming the PRC conquers the island, then what?  Could allied nations organize and mount a forcible return of Taiwan to its rightful owners?  Even assuming so, surely the results would leave most infrastructure destroyed or severely damaged, requiring years to rebuild.  Wargamers can dine out on that scenario for a long time. 

Then let’s think about the unthinkable:

Depending on Beijing’s reading of the geostrategic calculus, limited nuclear use conceivably could be an option—using tactical nukes against hardened targets such as buried command and control centers.  But at what point does the nuclear genie escape the bottle?

China has enough ICBMs to strike the 200 largest U.S. cities (down to Waco, Texas with 138,000).  And the PRC is building 300 more silos plus mobile missiles in 3,000 miles of tunnels.  

Thus, any retaliation would have to be against people, starting with CCP leaders, but unavoidably millions of innocents.  China has many densely populated megacities with eight as big or bigger than New York.  Each of 1,000 US warheads could kill 100 to 500 thousand people, if used against cities.  A quarter to a third of China's 1.4 billion people could die.

https://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/top-large-cities.htm

By contrast, the CCP might be able to kill "only" ten million Americans, “mostly Democrats” quipped one Independent observer.

Far more likely, another chip on Beijing’s table is quiet extortion.  Well beyond its massive influence among corrupt American politicians, the PRC could plant radioactive samples throughout the U.S. with notes, “Take your Geiger counters to these places.  Other sites contain backpack weapons.  Now stay away.”

To quote future Senator Fred Dalton Thompson as Admiral Painter in 1990’s The Hunt for Red October, “This business will get out of control.  It will get out of control and we’ll be lucky to live through it.”

PEARL HARBOR PLUS 80: "DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT"

On January 23, 2010, a retired Air Force officer died in San Diego, age 96. His name was Kermit A. Tyler. For most of his life, he was one of the least understood players in the Pearl Harbor tragedy. On December 7, 1941, Tyler was the officer who told radar operators plotting a large inbound bogey, “Don’t worry about it.” Those four words, spoken in a total information vacuum, led to decades of criticism. 

On that day of infamy, Tyler was a 28­-year-­old first lieutenant. He had grown up in California and enlisted as an aviation cadet in 1936. By late 1941, he had four years’ experience. 

At the time, Tyler was a pilot in the 78th Pursuit Squad­ron at Wheeler Field, north of Pearl Harbor. Wheeler was Oahu’s fighter base, home to eight squadrons. The 78th owned 16 P­-40Bs and three P-­26As—not unknown in that transitional period. 

At 4:00 that Sunday morning, Tyler reported to Fort Shafter to begin learning collateral duties at the interception control center, east of Pearl Harbor. That trip, however, was merely the second time Tyler had seen the facility. His previous visit had been a familiarization briefing that Wednesday. 

Tyler was to go off duty at 8:00 a.m. and, thereby, was caught in an historic time warp, as the bombs began falling at 7:55. But the incident for which he became known occurred nearly an hour previously. The radar station at Opana Point, on Oahu’s north coast, reported a large blip. Tyler was the only officer present; the others were at breakfast or still en route. Knowing little more than zero and unable to consult anybody, he was the one who had to make the decision because senior officers didn’t begin arriving until 20 minutes after the attack began. Consequently, in response to the Opana report, he uttered the apparently damning words, “Well, don’t worry about it.” 

Contrary to many accounts, Tyler suspected but did not know of a flight of B­-17s approaching from the mainland. The fact that a Honolulu radio station was transmitting before 4:00 a.m. was as much indication as he received. Subse­quently he testified that he believed the radar plot referred to friendlies: “I thought they were off course and that they were maybe working out some problem, and it confused me.” Due to inter-service secrecy, he had no information on U.S. Navy or Marine Corps flights, although a scouting mission was inbound from the carrier USS Enterprise. 

Tyler’s most telling testimony came months later: “I did not know what my duties were. I just was told to be there and told to maintain that work.” 

In short, Kermit Tyler inherited an untenable situation. Lacking training and supervision, he was wholly on his own. 

An assessment of the Hawaiian command structure goes a long way toward explaining Tyler’s dilemma. The U.S. Army was primarily responsible for the defense of the islands, under Lt. Gen. Walter Short. But there existed only moderate coop­eration between the Army and the Navy, despite months of growing concern over Japanese ambitions.

The Navy commander was Adm. Husband Kimmel, whose predecessor had been fired by President Roosevelt for opposing the Pacific Fleet’s move from California to Hawaii. Rather than deterring Tokyo, the move merely placed a tempting target within range of Japan’s uniquely capable carrier striking force.  Pacific War historian John B. Lundstrom aptly described Kido Butai’s six carriers as “a 1941 atom bomb.”  Nobody else had anything remotely comparable.

Following the attack, Tyler worked at headquarters of the 18th Pursuit Group and flew scheduled patrols. An inquiry held in 1942 cleared him of any wrongdoing, and like most prewar pilots, he advanced rapidly. Promoted to major only nine months after Pearl Harbor, he assumed command of the 44th Fighter Squadron, serving in the Southwest Pacific until May 1943. While flying P-­40s, he claimed a Zero, probably destroyed. 

After the war, Tyler rose to lieutenant colonel and briefly led a Lockheed F­-94 wing. His final position was with the North American Air Defense Command at Colorado Springs, Colorado. 

Upon retiring in 1961, Tyler returned to California with his wife and four children. He attended college; earned a real­ estate license; and enjoyed golf, tennis, and surfing. 

Tyler still incurred criticism and vitriol among the relatively few people who knew his name. One website even established a whimsical Kermit Tyler award for unpreparedness. The blogger acknowledged, however, that Tyler was not directly responsible for the Pearl Harbor debacle when everyone above him was far more culpable, reaching back to Washington, D.C. 

Tyler was convinced to emerge from obscurity for a Pearl Harbor symposium in 1991, when the public learned more about the actual conditions at Fort Shafter. Although in declining health, he occasionally spoke to reporters who sought his perspective. In 2007, he told the Newark Star-Ledger, “I wake up at night sometimes and think about it. But I don’t feel guilty. I did all I could that morning.” 

At this late date, it’s appropriate to tell Kermit Tyler and his family, “Colonel, don’t worry about it.”