Apparently we're at war with Libya. At least that's how it appears, as on Day One U.S. Navy ships and submarines fired more than 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Libyan thug and international terrorist Moamar Qaddafi (however his name is spelled this week). Meanwhile, Marine Corps Harriers launched from the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge. That's because we haven't had big-deck carriers in the Mediterranean for a couple of years due to all that "rightsizing" that began under Bill Klinton and the GOP wimps in congress. Meanwhile, the Air Force has put B-2s, F-15s and F-16s overhead. That's in concert with other nations as diverse as France, Britain, Spain, and Qatar, with Paris providing msot of the leadership and muscle. (British participation is noteworthy considering the odiously shamelful episode when one of the 1988 Lockerbie bombers was returned to a 2009 hero's welcome in Tripoli in exchange for oil concessions.)
One thing is missing. Well, OK, several things are missing, but one really big thing: A MISSION STATEMENT. I.E., what is our goal in Libya beyond bombing the air defences?
Thus far the only statements that remotely answer that essential question have come from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and some spokespersons who allude to "protectingLibyan civilians." Well, if that's the goal, then We The People are entitled to ask, "Protecting civilians to what end, and for how long? And what other nations' civilians are we presumably bound to protect?" Since Barack Hussein Obama has stated that no American ground forces will be committed to Libyan soil, are we to conduct an air campaign indefinitely?
America has a long history of trouble with Libya, dating from the Barbary pirates of the early 1800s. In 1981 and 1986 the Navy clashed with Qaddafi when carrier based fighters downed four Libyan jets during exercizes along the notorious "Line of Death." In 1986 Navy and Air Force planes struck Libyan targets in retaliation for a terrorist bombing that killed Americans in Germany.
The current air offensive began with approval of the Arab League and a United Nations resolution supporting use of force against the Libyan government. However, barely had the Tomahawks left their launch cells than the head of the League began backpedaling, saying that the allied measures were excessive. A typical diplomtic double standard expressed in doublespeak: please help us solve the problem but don't solive it too violently.
If any multinational endeavor is doomed to fail, it's this one.
The operation is called Odyssey Dawn, which at least avoids the grandiose and often self-serving names of U.S. missions such as Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom. The generic title of the Libyan op undoubtedly reflects the colalborative nature of the endeavor, especially since the Europeans have the lead.
Perhaps it's understandable that politicians like Obama and Clinton decided to remain nonspecific about America's objective in Libya. But that does not excuse the deafening silence from the military professionals responsible for executing the "plan." If there is a plan. Every one of the service chiefs attended war college at some point, presumably learning about the military-political-industrial complex, and presumably reading some geopolitical theory. The Prussian genral Karl von Clausewitz wrote the bible on military theory about 180 years ago, and On War has been required reading ever since. Clausewitz 101 begins at the beginning, which is a fine place to begin. Among his nine rules of war, the first is "Define the mission." Thus far the joint chiefs have flunked the course, and apparently they require remedial education.
Some essential topics are going unexamined in the media. How will a cobbled-together coalition of naval and air forces from multiple nations operate together with little or no prior training? How well do they communicate? What are the rules of engagement, and are they standardized? (Reportedly the French are free to whack Qaddafi while Americans are not.) And perhaps more importantly, what happens if the Libyans or anyone else comes out to play? Is a generic air/submarine defense adequate to the challenge? We don't know.
At home there's very little discussion about the legitimacy of the U.S. operation. The War Powers Act requires the president to notify congress within 48 hours of beginning military operations, with a 60-day grace period before further consultation. If Obama bothered to comply with the law, it seems a well kept secret, and the lack of a clear mission satement in Libya permits only two conclusions: either the administration and the military establishment are incompetent, or they fear that stating a specific goal could prove inconvenient or embarrassing. Therefore, the U.S. Government has decided to provide no yardstick because that would afford an objective measure of the extent of America's failure in the Libyan adventure.
Monday, March 21, 2011
Thursday, February 17, 2011
THE MIDDLE KINGDOM VS THE LAND OF OZ
I like Australians. They’re a fun-loving race; staunch allies as ready for a fight as for a bash at the pub. A friend who flew in North Africa said the best of the British Commonwealth forces were Aussies and South Africans. Not much on spit and polish, but then how much polish do you need in Tunisia?
Recently I realized that Aussies (who call themselves Ozzies, from “Ozstralia”) afford a rare perspective on China. With continued growth of China’s population, economy, and global influence, the view from the Land of Oz is worth a peek at the ancient Middle Kingdom.
My interest in the China-Australia connection was piqued by a reference to the RAAF’s interest in acquiring America’s latest stealth aircraft, the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II. It’s a separate issue, but that bird is far-far over budget and behind schedule, and the program may not deserve to survive on its merits. Its political-financial considerations seem likely to overwhelm the practical concerns.
Anyway…
I wondered why Australia would want a stealth fighter, even assuming it’s affordable. After all, considering the immense disparity in their militaries (there are only 80,000 Ozzies in uniform, including reserves) if it comes to a fight, China wins in a walk. The question is: why would China want Australia, and what would Beijing do with The Land of Oz?
(A brief aside, but the cinematic opportunity looms large: “Hey, babe, imagine Crocodile Dundee Meets Red Dawn.”)
Let’s consider some statistics.
Though Australia covers 2.9 million square miles, barely 6 percent is arable. The interior is largely uninhabitable which is why almost half the population lives in five metro areas with one-third of the total in Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane. A near identical portion of the 22.5 million Ozzies lives in the southeastern state of New South Wales. Perth is the only large city on the west coast, 1,700 miles from Melbourne.
China is one-quarter larger than Australia but possesses nearly three times as much arable land. There just isn’t much to be gained by conquering Australia, apart from the disastrous consequences to Beijing’s relations with its major trading partners.
However, if Canberra truly worries about deterring Beijing, there are one or two options. The first is to invite American military bases, especially on the west and north coasts. (There’s precedent: the Japanese threatened landings near Darwin in 1942.) While Uncle Sugar’s thinly-stretched forces probably couldn’t manage more than a trip-wire presence, that might be enough. Another prospect is nuke subs for the Oz Nivey, but that involves various related problems: Australia (with 23 percent of the world’s known uranium) has no nuclear industry, and the U.S. does not export that kind of naval technology.
One of my Oz mates offers an illuminating perspective on Chinese-Australia politics: the labour movement's socialists and communists loathe each other. Many of the latter resemble Communists more than some Chinese officials. Says Peter, “They absolutely will not criticize Beijing. If you ask them about human rights violations, the Dalai Lama or Tibet, they immediately change the subject.” However, they’re a decided minority. The broader Labour base includes working-class blokes who are approximately patriotic and don’t mind paying high taxes for entitlements, especially when they get their ration of beer. (OTOH, the Liberal Party is mostly conservative go figger.)
So where does Oz politics leave us regarding China?
If you look beyond Beijing, the actual concern is China's support of nations and alliances on the periphery, as close as the Solomons, which ultimately could affect Aussie security or trade routes.
To quote an Australian military correspondent, “We are spending heaps to keep the neighbors friendly, and the Chinese are spending more to acquire footholds all around the ocean area. They are building a big navy and recently challenged the U.S. Navy to keep out of ‘their coastal seas’, which the USN declined to do and sent a carrier group through.” Therefore, any direct military threat to Oz—extremely unlikely-- will come from the littorals, not by hordes of Chinese amphibious troops.
As with the much overhyped Chinese military “threat” to the U.S., Beijing is not going to invade a major trading partner. Australia ranks seventh among China’s foreign purchasers, just ahead of Russia forepetesake. War with Oz would be self-defeating. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_largest_trading_partners_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China)
Meanwhile, Beijing has considerable internal problems to address before embarking on the road to conquest. China’s unemployment rate has remained steady at around 4 percent for over a decade. That’s the good news. The bad news: The Middle Kingdom now must find some 30 million new jobs per year to maintain that figure. That’s essential for the goal of growing the middle class, which is necessary to bolster the internal economy without relying so heavily on foreign markets. (And if that sounds decidedly non-communist, you’re right. Nobody said that politics has to make sense.)
China's internal situation is a complex subject owing to economic and demographic concerns. I already cited the need to generate some 30 million new jobs each year. That figure keeps popping up. It’s also the number of young single men who are unlikely to marry, owing to the single-child policy. (http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/opinion/chinas-30-million-bachelors/story-e6frerdf-1111116459631)
As my mate Peter put it, "That’s a lot of spare infantry." If Beijing wants to deplete that surplus, a war with Oz is decidedly not the way to accomplish it. Strapping on Russia makes far more Draconian sense.
So what should we be worried about from The Middle Kingdom? It’s not military adventurism nor even an invasion of Taiwan. (Apart from disastrous political/economic repercussions, people who have been there note that the ChiNats have had 60 years to prepare, and they train hard. Odds are it would fail.)
Consider China’s history. Immune from foreign invasion since 1945, the source of conflict is internal, as per the Cultural Revolution. An Ozzie friend who studies the subject says, “If I had to bet next month’s beer money on a war involving China, it would be civil war.”
A growing population hungry for a better life, coupled with the societal tensions of millions of frustrated young males, could prove a toxic binary. Civil war in China
has to be one of the great bone-chillers of the XXI Century.
Recently I realized that Aussies (who call themselves Ozzies, from “Ozstralia”) afford a rare perspective on China. With continued growth of China’s population, economy, and global influence, the view from the Land of Oz is worth a peek at the ancient Middle Kingdom.
My interest in the China-Australia connection was piqued by a reference to the RAAF’s interest in acquiring America’s latest stealth aircraft, the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II. It’s a separate issue, but that bird is far-far over budget and behind schedule, and the program may not deserve to survive on its merits. Its political-financial considerations seem likely to overwhelm the practical concerns.
Anyway…
I wondered why Australia would want a stealth fighter, even assuming it’s affordable. After all, considering the immense disparity in their militaries (there are only 80,000 Ozzies in uniform, including reserves) if it comes to a fight, China wins in a walk. The question is: why would China want Australia, and what would Beijing do with The Land of Oz?
(A brief aside, but the cinematic opportunity looms large: “Hey, babe, imagine Crocodile Dundee Meets Red Dawn.”)
Let’s consider some statistics.
Though Australia covers 2.9 million square miles, barely 6 percent is arable. The interior is largely uninhabitable which is why almost half the population lives in five metro areas with one-third of the total in Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane. A near identical portion of the 22.5 million Ozzies lives in the southeastern state of New South Wales. Perth is the only large city on the west coast, 1,700 miles from Melbourne.
China is one-quarter larger than Australia but possesses nearly three times as much arable land. There just isn’t much to be gained by conquering Australia, apart from the disastrous consequences to Beijing’s relations with its major trading partners.
However, if Canberra truly worries about deterring Beijing, there are one or two options. The first is to invite American military bases, especially on the west and north coasts. (There’s precedent: the Japanese threatened landings near Darwin in 1942.) While Uncle Sugar’s thinly-stretched forces probably couldn’t manage more than a trip-wire presence, that might be enough. Another prospect is nuke subs for the Oz Nivey, but that involves various related problems: Australia (with 23 percent of the world’s known uranium) has no nuclear industry, and the U.S. does not export that kind of naval technology.
One of my Oz mates offers an illuminating perspective on Chinese-Australia politics: the labour movement's socialists and communists loathe each other. Many of the latter resemble Communists more than some Chinese officials. Says Peter, “They absolutely will not criticize Beijing. If you ask them about human rights violations, the Dalai Lama or Tibet, they immediately change the subject.” However, they’re a decided minority. The broader Labour base includes working-class blokes who are approximately patriotic and don’t mind paying high taxes for entitlements, especially when they get their ration of beer. (OTOH, the Liberal Party is mostly conservative go figger.)
So where does Oz politics leave us regarding China?
If you look beyond Beijing, the actual concern is China's support of nations and alliances on the periphery, as close as the Solomons, which ultimately could affect Aussie security or trade routes.
To quote an Australian military correspondent, “We are spending heaps to keep the neighbors friendly, and the Chinese are spending more to acquire footholds all around the ocean area. They are building a big navy and recently challenged the U.S. Navy to keep out of ‘their coastal seas’, which the USN declined to do and sent a carrier group through.” Therefore, any direct military threat to Oz—extremely unlikely-- will come from the littorals, not by hordes of Chinese amphibious troops.
As with the much overhyped Chinese military “threat” to the U.S., Beijing is not going to invade a major trading partner. Australia ranks seventh among China’s foreign purchasers, just ahead of Russia forepetesake. War with Oz would be self-defeating. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_largest_trading_partners_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China)
Meanwhile, Beijing has considerable internal problems to address before embarking on the road to conquest. China’s unemployment rate has remained steady at around 4 percent for over a decade. That’s the good news. The bad news: The Middle Kingdom now must find some 30 million new jobs per year to maintain that figure. That’s essential for the goal of growing the middle class, which is necessary to bolster the internal economy without relying so heavily on foreign markets. (And if that sounds decidedly non-communist, you’re right. Nobody said that politics has to make sense.)
China's internal situation is a complex subject owing to economic and demographic concerns. I already cited the need to generate some 30 million new jobs each year. That figure keeps popping up. It’s also the number of young single men who are unlikely to marry, owing to the single-child policy. (http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/opinion/chinas-30-million-bachelors/story-e6frerdf-1111116459631)
As my mate Peter put it, "That’s a lot of spare infantry." If Beijing wants to deplete that surplus, a war with Oz is decidedly not the way to accomplish it. Strapping on Russia makes far more Draconian sense.
So what should we be worried about from The Middle Kingdom? It’s not military adventurism nor even an invasion of Taiwan. (Apart from disastrous political/economic repercussions, people who have been there note that the ChiNats have had 60 years to prepare, and they train hard. Odds are it would fail.)
Consider China’s history. Immune from foreign invasion since 1945, the source of conflict is internal, as per the Cultural Revolution. An Ozzie friend who studies the subject says, “If I had to bet next month’s beer money on a war involving China, it would be civil war.”
A growing population hungry for a better life, coupled with the societal tensions of millions of frustrated young males, could prove a toxic binary. Civil war in China
has to be one of the great bone-chillers of the XXI Century.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS
This month’s Rant is excerpted from my Flight Journal article in December 2009. Somebody put it on email (minus attribution) so I’m posting most of the main text.
Imagine that you are commander of a great air force. It has risen to global prominence, dominating all rivals. Its unprecedented success has come at a price, however. Your chief of staff lays a memo on your desk. "Last month's casualties, sir."
You pick up the first sheet. “Hmmm; 331 men killed, and 308 aircraft destroyed. That’s 11 people and 10 planes per day.”
“Uh, yessir. It’s still the ballpark average.”
Imagine that you are commander of a great air force. It has risen to global prominence, dominating all rivals. Its unprecedented success has come at a price, however. Your chief of staff lays a memo on your desk. "Last month's casualties, sir."
You pick up the first sheet. “Hmmm; 331 men killed, and 308 aircraft destroyed. That’s 11 people and 10 planes per day.”
“Uh, yessir. It’s still the ballpark average.”
"I’d like to see an improvement in bomber losses, those really add up."
“Were working on it, General. But it’s sad to think that 10 young men alive today will be dead tomorrow.
“You know that’s the price of doing business. Now, what about the overseas and combat losses?”
That’s right. From December 1941 to August 1945 the U. S. Army Air Forces lost 14,903 pilots, aircrew and assorted personnel plus 13,873 airplanes --- inside the continental United States. They were the result of 52,651 aircraft accidents (6,039 involving fatalities) in 45 months.
Think about those numbers. They average 1,170 aircraft accidents per month---nearly 40 a day. (Less than one accident in four resulted in totaled aircraft, however.) Those colossal losses cost the Axis powers nothing; not one 7.7 mm bullet.
It gets worse,
Almost 1,000 Army planes disappeared en route from the U. S. to foreign climes. But an eye watering 43,581 aircraft were lost overseas including 22,948 on combat missions (18,418 against the Western Axis) and 20,633 attributed to non-combat causes overseas.
Some spectacular losses were recorded in the air campaign against Germany. The best known was the 8th Air Force’s double strike against Regensburg and Schewinfurt in August 1943 when 60 B-17s were shot down among 376. That 16 percent loss rate meant nearly 600 empty bunks in England. In fact, during much of 1942-1943 it was statistically impossible for bomber crews to complete a 25-mission tour in Europe.
Pacific Theatre losses were far less (4,530 in combat) owing to smaller forces committed. The worst B-29 mission, against Tokyo on May 25, 1945, cost 26 Superfortress, 5.6 percent of the 464 dispatched from the Marianas.
On average, 6,600 American servicemen died per month during WWII, about 220 a day. At war’s end, over 40,000 airmen were killed in combat theatres and another 18,000 wounded. Some 12,000 missing men were declared dead, including a number “liberated” by the Soviets but never returned. More than 41,000 were captured, half of the 5,400 held by the Japanese died in captivity, compared with one-tenth in German hands. Total combat casualties were pegged at 121,867. But U.S. manpower made up the deficit. The AAF’s peak strength was reached in 1944 with 2,372,000 personnel, nearly twice the previous year.
If the losses were huge---and they were----so were production totals. From 1941 through 1945, American industry delivered more than 276,000 military aircraft. That number was enough not only for U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps but for allies as diverse as Britain, Australia, China and Russia. In fact, from 1943 onward, America produced more planes than Britain and Russia combined. And more than both Germany and Japan 1941-45.
Uncle Sam sent many of his sons to war with absolute minimum of training. Some fighter pilots entered combat in 1942 with less than one hour in their assigned aircraft.
The 357th Fighter Group went to England in late 1943 after training on P-39s. The group never saw a Mustang until shortly before its first combat mission. A high-time P-51pilot had 30 hours in type. Many had fewer than five hours. Some had one hour.
A future Thunderbolt ace said, “I was sent to England to die.” He was not alone. Some fighter pilots took off on their first combat mission with one previous flight in type. With arrival of new aircraft, many combat units transitioned in combat. The attitude was, “They all have a stick and throttle. Go fly `em.” When the 4th Fighter Group converted from P-47s to P-51s in February 1944, there was no time to stand down for an orderly transition. The group commander, Col. Donald Blakeslee, said, “You can learn to fly `51’s on the way to the target."
Meanwhile, many bomber crews were still learning their trade: of Jimmy Doolittle’s 15 pilots on the April 1942 Tokyo raid, only five had won their wings before 1941. All but one of the 16 copilots were less than a year out of flight school.
In WWII flying safety took a back seat to combat. The AAF’s worst accident rate was recorded by the A-36 Invader version of the P-51: a staggering 274 per 100,000 flying hours. Next worst were the P-39 at 245 and the P-40 at 188; and the P-38 at 139. All were Allison powered.
Bomber wrecks were fewer but more expensive. The B-17 and B-24 averaged 30 and 35 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, respectively----a horrific figure considering that from 1980 to 2000 the Air Force’s major mishap rate was less than 2.
The B-29 was even worse at 40; the world’s most sophisticated, most capable and most expensive bomber was too urgently needed to stand down for mere safety reasons. The original cadre of the 58th Bomb Wing was to have 400 hours of multi-engine time, but there were not enough experienced pilots to meet the criterion. Only ten percent had overseas experience.
Perhaps the greatest unsung success story of AAF training was navigators. The Army graduated some 50,000 during the war, and many had never flown out of sight of land before leaving for a war zone. Yet the huge majority found their way across oceans and continents without getting lost or running out of fuel---a stirring tribute to the AAF’s educational establishments.
As the training pipeline filled up, cockpit experience improved. By early 1944 the average AAF fighter pilot entering combat had logged at least 450 hours, usually including 250 hours in training. At the same time, many captains and first lieutenants claimed over 600 hours.
At its height in mid-1944, the Army Air Forces had 2.6 million people and nearly 80,000 aircraft of all types. Today the U. S. Air Force employs 327,000 active personnel (plus 170,000 civilians) with 5,500+ manned and perhaps 200 unmanned aircraft. The 2009 figures represent about 12 percent of the manpower and 7 percent of the airplanes of the WWII peak.
Whether there will ever be another comparable air war is doubtful, as fighters and bombers have given way to helicopters and remotely controlled drones over Afghanistan and Iraq. But within living memory, men left the earth in 1,000-plane formations and fought major battles five miles high, leaving a legacy that remains timeless.
“Were working on it, General. But it’s sad to think that 10 young men alive today will be dead tomorrow.
“You know that’s the price of doing business. Now, what about the overseas and combat losses?”
That’s right. From December 1941 to August 1945 the U. S. Army Air Forces lost 14,903 pilots, aircrew and assorted personnel plus 13,873 airplanes --- inside the continental United States. They were the result of 52,651 aircraft accidents (6,039 involving fatalities) in 45 months.
Think about those numbers. They average 1,170 aircraft accidents per month---nearly 40 a day. (Less than one accident in four resulted in totaled aircraft, however.) Those colossal losses cost the Axis powers nothing; not one 7.7 mm bullet.
It gets worse,
Almost 1,000 Army planes disappeared en route from the U. S. to foreign climes. But an eye watering 43,581 aircraft were lost overseas including 22,948 on combat missions (18,418 against the Western Axis) and 20,633 attributed to non-combat causes overseas.
Some spectacular losses were recorded in the air campaign against Germany. The best known was the 8th Air Force’s double strike against Regensburg and Schewinfurt in August 1943 when 60 B-17s were shot down among 376. That 16 percent loss rate meant nearly 600 empty bunks in England. In fact, during much of 1942-1943 it was statistically impossible for bomber crews to complete a 25-mission tour in Europe.
Pacific Theatre losses were far less (4,530 in combat) owing to smaller forces committed. The worst B-29 mission, against Tokyo on May 25, 1945, cost 26 Superfortress, 5.6 percent of the 464 dispatched from the Marianas.
On average, 6,600 American servicemen died per month during WWII, about 220 a day. At war’s end, over 40,000 airmen were killed in combat theatres and another 18,000 wounded. Some 12,000 missing men were declared dead, including a number “liberated” by the Soviets but never returned. More than 41,000 were captured, half of the 5,400 held by the Japanese died in captivity, compared with one-tenth in German hands. Total combat casualties were pegged at 121,867. But U.S. manpower made up the deficit. The AAF’s peak strength was reached in 1944 with 2,372,000 personnel, nearly twice the previous year.
If the losses were huge---and they were----so were production totals. From 1941 through 1945, American industry delivered more than 276,000 military aircraft. That number was enough not only for U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps but for allies as diverse as Britain, Australia, China and Russia. In fact, from 1943 onward, America produced more planes than Britain and Russia combined. And more than both Germany and Japan 1941-45.
Uncle Sam sent many of his sons to war with absolute minimum of training. Some fighter pilots entered combat in 1942 with less than one hour in their assigned aircraft.
The 357th Fighter Group went to England in late 1943 after training on P-39s. The group never saw a Mustang until shortly before its first combat mission. A high-time P-51pilot had 30 hours in type. Many had fewer than five hours. Some had one hour.
A future Thunderbolt ace said, “I was sent to England to die.” He was not alone. Some fighter pilots took off on their first combat mission with one previous flight in type. With arrival of new aircraft, many combat units transitioned in combat. The attitude was, “They all have a stick and throttle. Go fly `em.” When the 4th Fighter Group converted from P-47s to P-51s in February 1944, there was no time to stand down for an orderly transition. The group commander, Col. Donald Blakeslee, said, “You can learn to fly `51’s on the way to the target."
Meanwhile, many bomber crews were still learning their trade: of Jimmy Doolittle’s 15 pilots on the April 1942 Tokyo raid, only five had won their wings before 1941. All but one of the 16 copilots were less than a year out of flight school.
In WWII flying safety took a back seat to combat. The AAF’s worst accident rate was recorded by the A-36 Invader version of the P-51: a staggering 274 per 100,000 flying hours. Next worst were the P-39 at 245 and the P-40 at 188; and the P-38 at 139. All were Allison powered.
Bomber wrecks were fewer but more expensive. The B-17 and B-24 averaged 30 and 35 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, respectively----a horrific figure considering that from 1980 to 2000 the Air Force’s major mishap rate was less than 2.
The B-29 was even worse at 40; the world’s most sophisticated, most capable and most expensive bomber was too urgently needed to stand down for mere safety reasons. The original cadre of the 58th Bomb Wing was to have 400 hours of multi-engine time, but there were not enough experienced pilots to meet the criterion. Only ten percent had overseas experience.
Perhaps the greatest unsung success story of AAF training was navigators. The Army graduated some 50,000 during the war, and many had never flown out of sight of land before leaving for a war zone. Yet the huge majority found their way across oceans and continents without getting lost or running out of fuel---a stirring tribute to the AAF’s educational establishments.
As the training pipeline filled up, cockpit experience improved. By early 1944 the average AAF fighter pilot entering combat had logged at least 450 hours, usually including 250 hours in training. At the same time, many captains and first lieutenants claimed over 600 hours.
At its height in mid-1944, the Army Air Forces had 2.6 million people and nearly 80,000 aircraft of all types. Today the U. S. Air Force employs 327,000 active personnel (plus 170,000 civilians) with 5,500+ manned and perhaps 200 unmanned aircraft. The 2009 figures represent about 12 percent of the manpower and 7 percent of the airplanes of the WWII peak.
Whether there will ever be another comparable air war is doubtful, as fighters and bombers have given way to helicopters and remotely controlled drones over Afghanistan and Iraq. But within living memory, men left the earth in 1,000-plane formations and fought major battles five miles high, leaving a legacy that remains timeless.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
